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At its ordinary session held October 13-27, 2001, theAfrican Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights(Commission) delivered a landmark decision involv-
ing the direct application of a range of economic, social, and
cultural rights entrenched in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). The African Charter
is currently the only regional human rights instrument that
incorporates economic, social, and cultural rights as well as
civil and political rights and subjects all of these rights to a
complaint procedure. The judgment handed down by the
Commission in The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and
the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (SERAC
Case) marked the first decision that directly addresses the
enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights since
the Commission became operational in November 1987.
Recapturing the Debate on the Justiciability of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights
Whether economic, social, and cultural rights are capa-
ble of judicial enforcement elicited heated debate in the
United Nations during the drafting of the International Bill
of Human Rights. The outcome of the controversy was the
bifurcation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The contention that
economic, social, and cultural rights are different in nature
from civil and political rights was central to the decision to
adopt the two instruments. Animated by the Cold War, West-
ern countries maintained that economic, social, and cul-
tural rights are ideals to be attained. The countries argued
that enforcement of these rights is programmatic and costly,
and therefore dependent on the availability of state resources.
Furthermore, they argued that economic, social, and cultural
rights lack specificity and entail intricate policy decisions
regarding their implementation. The Western countries’
view is that the judiciary is not institutionally competent
and not democratically legitimate enough to make such dif-
ficult policy choices, therefore rendering judicial enforce-
ment inappropriate.
Although socialist countries made persuasive arguments
for the equal treatment of economic, social, and cultural
rights and civil and political rights, the adoption of the two
Covenants marked victory for the West on the issue. While
the ICCPR has a provision for judicial enforcement, the
ICESCR provides for state reporting as the ultimate super-
visory mechanism. The right of petition by individuals or
groups alleging violations of these rights fell away from the
ICESCR with the rejection by the UN of a complaint pro-
cedure as an additional implementation measure. 
Since the two Covenants were adopted in 1966, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights have enjoyed marginal
status as compared to civil and political rights. Although
later international human rights instruments such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) make no distinction among cat-
egories of rights, the enforcement mechanisms do not
provide for the adjudication of economic, social, and cultural
rights. Only recently has serious consideration been given to
boosting the monitoring mechanisms of economic social, and
cultural rights. At the international level, efforts regarding
judicial enforcement resulted in the adoption of an optional
protocol concerning economic, social, and cultural rights to
CEDAW on March 12, 1999. A similar draft optional proto-
col to the ICESCR was concluded in 1996 and is pending
before the Commission on Human Rights.
The African Charter: A Brief Introduction
The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the Orga-
nization of African Unity (OAU), marking the introduction
of a third regional human rights system in the world, after
the creation of the European and inter-American systems.
Adopted partly due to external pressure on African gov-
ernments to develop a human rights regime on the continent
and partly as a response to the massive human rights viola-
tions committed by African leaders such as Idi Amin of
Uganda, Dr. Banda of Malawi, Emperor Bokassa of Central
African Republic, and Mengistu of Ethiopia, the African
Charter is distinctive in its attempt to attach an “African
fingerprint” on human rights discourse. 
Human rights scholars have acclaimed the African Char-
ter for including economic, social, and cultural rights as
well as civil and political rights in one binding instrument.
Its preamble affirms the cardinal principle of interdepen-
dence and indivisibility of all human rights by expressly
declaring, “civil and political rights cannot be dissociated
from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception
as well as universality.” Among other rights, the African
Charter gives express recognition to the right to property,
the right to work, the right to enjoy the best attainable state
of physical and mental health, the right to education, and
the right to family protection, including special measures for
the protection of the aged and disabled. 
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It is striking to note that the economic, social, and cultural
rights enshrined in the African Charter are formulated as
direct entitlements of individuals or groups. This is unlike
the ICESCR, which uses such language as “the state under-
takes to recognize” and “the state undertakes to take steps.”
The advantage with the Charter’s formulation is that it
allows more room for the application of these rights to non-
state actors, who are increasingly regarded as having human
rights obligations. Furthermore, the economic, social, and
cultural rights provisions in the Charter are couched in
such a way as to create immediate obligations. By contrast,
the ICESCR qualifies these rights with such phrases as “pro-
gressive realization” and “to the maximum of available
resources.” This formulation of the ICESCR was adopted to
emphasize economic, social, and cultural rights as ideals to
be attained depending on the avail-
ability of resources, as opposed to
civil and political rights, which are
deemed to be precise and imme-
diately claimable. In 1990, the
Committee on the ICESCR clari-
fied in General Comment 3 that
the term progressive realization
implies an obligation of states to
move as expeditiously and effec-
tively as possible towards the attain-
ment of the right in question. The Committee further stated,
based on extensive examination of state reports, this term
engenders a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of min-
imum essential levels of each of the rights. In comparison to
the ICESCR, Chidi Odinkalu, a leading scholar on the
African regional system of human rights, has argued that the
creation of immediate obligations by the Charter enables the
Commission to adopt a “violations approach” to the imple-
mentation of these rights. This approach allows the Com-
mission to make decisions based on real-life situations and
specific allegations, as opposed to the ICESCR, which requires
that countries, according to their level of resources, develop
different performance standards for each right over time.
As part of bolstering the principle of interdependence of
all rights, the African Charter entrenches third generation
rights, which the international system has persistently side-
lined. Third generation rights are the newest set of rights to
be recognized by the international community. They include
the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and
natural resources (Article 21); the right to economic, social,
and cultural development (Article 22); and the right to a gen-
erally satisfactory environment favorable to their development
(Article 24). These rights arise out of the demand by the
Third World countries for global redistribution of power,
wealth, and other important standards.  Also described as sol-
idarity rights, these rights require that all members of the
international community make concerted efforts for their
realization.  They are therefore critical to the enjoyment of
both economic, social, and cultural rights and civil and
political rights. The SERAC Case highlights the importance
of these rights in the African context. 
Significantly, the African Charter proffers the same enforce-
ment mechanism to all categories of rights. Under Articles 47,
55, and 56, the African Commission hears complaints alleg-
ing violations of any rights recognized in the Charter and the
standing requirements for bringing cases before the Com-
mission is admirably broad. Individuals as well as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status in
the Commission can commence cases against a state. The
Commission grants observer status to any organization work-
ing in the human rights field whose objectives and activities
comply with the fundamental principles of the OAU Charter
and the African Charter. The organization must also declare
its financial resources and must have an established struc-
ture. Apart from engaging in public interest litigation, NGOs
with observer status are given wide space to participate in the
sessions of the Commission, including making statements
and proposals, asking questions, commenting on promo-
tional reports, and submitting amicus briefs. 
Despite these positive aspects, the Charter has received
wide-ranging criticisms from international and African schol-
ars. Disapproval has primarily focused on the Charter’s weak
enforcement mechanism, since the Charter chose to rely on
the Commission instead of a court. This choice was motivated
by the OAU’s preference for a
diplomatic and bilateral dispute
settlement mechanism. The argu-
ment was that confrontational lit-
igation, common to Western legal
systems, is alien to African culture.
Participants also feared that on
the basis of the apparent insuffi-
ciency of political will at the time,
African governments would not
ratify the Charter if it provided for
a court. Thus, the Commission was established as the body
to promote human rights, although it has no powers of
enforcement, cannot award damages or condemn an offend-
ing state, and can only make recommendations to the par-
ties when a violation of a right is found.
Recognizing these weaknesses, the OAU adopted the
Protocol to the African Charter establishing an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on June 9, 1998. Five
of the 15 states needed to bring the Court into operation have
ratified the Protocol: Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Sene-
gal, and Uganda. Predictably, the Protocol empowers the
Court to provide remedies for violations such as compen-
sation and provisional measures to avoid irreparable harm.
Provision is made for the Council of Ministers to monitor the
execution of judgment.
The Charter’s recognition of third generation rights has
been further criticized for being redundant since they have
no specific content and can be realized through the imple-
mentation of already recognized individual rights. Professor
Joe Oloka-Onyango described the exclusion of these rights
from the Charter, such as the right to housing and shelter;
the right to social security; the right to adequate standard of
living; and freedom from hunger, as a “significant letdown.”
Additionally, some commentators have expressed pessimism
regarding the African Commission’s ability to translate the
provisions of the Charter into practice.
SERAC Case
The Facts
The complainants brought an action against the Nigerian
government for violations of an array of economic, social, and
cultural rights committed by the state-owned National Nigerian
Petroleum Company (NNPC) and Shell Petroleum Develop-
ment Corporation, in which the NNPC held a majority of
shares. The complaint alleged that the companies exploited oil
in Ogoniland, Nigeria without regard for the environment or
Africa, continued from previous page
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health of the local communities. Toxic wastes were deposited
into the local environment and waterways without developing
or properly maintaining appropriate facilities intended to pre-
vent the wastes from affecting surrounding local villages. The
resulting water, soil, and air contamination caused serious
short- and long-term health problems, including skin infections,
gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, increased risk of can-
cer, and neurological and reproductive complications. 
The complaint further alleged that the Nigerian govern-
ment not only condoned these harmful operations but aided
in their perpetration by placing the legal and military powers
of the state at the disposal of the oil companies. It also alleged
that the Nigerian Army carried out
a series of ruthless military opera-
tions, including the burning and
destruction of houses and food, and
the killing of people and their live-
stock. The government neither
monitored the oil companies nor
required them to consult with the
Ogoni people on issues concern-
ing the development of their land.
The government of Nigeria did not
respond to the Commission’s notification of the complaint,
therefore the Commission accepted the complaint’s allegations
as facts.
Admissibi l i ty
Two NGOs, the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre
and the Center for Economic and Social Rights, brought this
action to the Commission on behalf of the Ogoni people.
Because a domestic tribunal or court in Nigeria had not heard
the complaint, a decision had to be made whether it was
admissible within the requirements of the exhaustion of local
remedies rule. Under Article 56(5) of the Charter, a com-
plainant must exhaust all local remedies before approaching
the Commission. According to the Commission’s previous
jurisprudence, this rule serves to give the responding govern-
ment notice of the violation, thereby affording it an opportu-
nity to remedy the situation. However, the rule is not enforced
if there are no adequate or effective remedies, or if the com-
plaint discloses gross violations of human rights.
Relying on this well established exception to the exhaus-
tion of local remedies rule, the Commission declared the
Ogoni complaint admissible. The Commission found that
the action alleged many atrocities committed by the oil com-
panies. Secondly, it found as fact that the military government
passed several decrees making the prospect of receiving a
domestic remedy impossible. Finally, the Commission took the
view that the government of Nigeria had ample notice to
remedy the situation given the enormous international atten-
tion focused on the circumstances in Ogoniland. For these rea-
sons, the government could not insist on the exhaustion of
local remedies rule to justify dismissal of the complaint.
The Merits 
Obligations and Indivisibility of Human Rights
The Commission emphasized that all rights generate the
duties to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill. The Com-
mission underscored that these obligations engender a com-
bination of positive and negative dimensions. The duty to
respect requires that the state should refrain from interfer-
ing in the enjoyment of all fundamental rights. The duty to
protect obliges the state to protect rights-holders against
other subjects by, among other things, legislation and pro-
vision of effective remedies. The duty to promote enjoins the
state to ensure that individuals are able to exercise their rights
and freedoms by, for example, promoting tolerance, raising
awareness, and even building infrastructures. The duty to ful-
fill is a positive expectation on the state to make a good faith
effort toward realizing the rights. For instance, according to
the Commission, this could consist of the direct provision of
food or other basic needs. The Commission emphasized
that the application of these duties varies depending upon
the right under consideration. Thus, the full enjoyment of
some rights demand that the state take concerted action con-
sisting of more than one of those duties.
The Rights to Physical and Mental
Health and the Right to a Clean
Environment
The Commission found that the
Nigerian government violated the
right to health and a third gener-
ation right to a clean environment
by directly contaminating water,
soil, and air; harming the health of
the Ogoni people; and failing to
protect them from the harm
caused by the oil companies. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission underlined
that the right to a clean and safe environment is enshrined
under Article 24 of the African Charter. According to the
Commission, the right to a clean environment is extremely
critical to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural
rights “in so far as the environment affects the quality of life
and safety of the individual.” This right, it held, requires a
state “to take reasonable . . . measures to prevent pollution
and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and
to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use
of natural resources.”
Regarding the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health, under Article 16(1) of the Char-
ter, and the right to a generally satisfactory environment favor-
able to development, recognized under Article 24 of the
Charter, the Commission held that governments are pro-
hibited from directly threatening the health and environment
of their citizens. The Commission found that the duty to
respect these rights largely entails non-interventionist con-
duct from the state, such as refraining from carrying out,
sponsoring, or tolerating any practice, policy, or legal mea-
sures that violate the integrity of the individual.
The Commission stated that compliance with both the
right to health and the right to a clean environment must
include ordering, or at least permitting, independent sci-
entific monitoring of threatened environments and requir-
ing and publicizing environmental and social impact stud-
ies prior to any major industrial development. These rights
also require that the state must undertake appropriate mon-
itoring, provide information to the communities exposed to
hazardous materials and activities, and guarantee mean-
ingful opportunities for individuals to be heard and partic-
ipate in development decisions affecting their communi-
ties. The Nigerian government, it was held, failed to discharge
these obligations.
The government neither monitored the oil
companies nor required them to consult
with the Ogoni people on issues concern-
ing the development of their land.
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The Right to Natural Resources
Whether a group of people within a state may constitute
“a people” has long been contested, especially in the context
of the right to self-determination. In Katangese Peoples’ Con-
gress v. Zaire, for instance, the African Commission acknowl-
edged the controversy but avoided defining the term, “a
people.” Likewise, the Commission did not define the term
in the present case, but it found that the right of the Ogoni
people, under Article 21 of the Charter, to dispose of their
wealth and natural resources had been violated. This find-
ing was based on the fact that the oil exploitation in Ogo-
niland was pursued in a destructive and selfish fashion with-
out any material benefit to the local population. By
implication, the Commission considered the Ogoni popu-
lation to be “a people.”
State Liability for Acts of Private Actors
Drawing on jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights,
the Commission postulated that a state violates its duty to pro-
tect rights if it allows private persons or groups to act freely
and with impunity to the detriment of recognized rights. The
Commission found that the Nigerian government had given
a “green light” to the oil companies to commit human rights
violations. Nigeria’s failure to protect the Ogoni people
from the selfish acts of the oil companies amounted to a vio-
lation of Article 21.
The Right to Life
Furthermore, the Commission stated that the right to
life is the most fundamental of all human rights. This right
was violated by the Nigerian government when it permitted
its security forces to commit widespread terrorism and
killings and allowed pollution and environmental degrada-
tion, making living conditions in Ogoniland a “nightmare.”
The Commission also cited the destruction of land and
farms as part of its rationale that the right to life was violated.
Violations of Rights beyond the Charter
The Right to Food and Housing
Interestingly, the Commission also found violations of the
rights to housing and food, which are not expressly recog-
nized under the Charter. It determined, quite innovatively,
that the right to housing or shelter is implicitly entrenched
in the rights to property, family protection, and in the right
to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical
health. Likewise, the Commission inferred the right to food
from the rights to life and health and to economic, social,
and cultural development. 
The Commission held that the minimum core of the
right to shelter obliges the state not to destroy its citizens’
houses, let alone obstruct efforts by individuals or commu-
nities to rebuild lost homes. The duty to respect this right
requires that the state and its agents refrain from carrying
out, sponsoring, or tolerating any practice, policy, or legal
measure that violates the integrity of the individual or
infringes upon the freedom of an individual to use available
resources necessary for satisfying individual, family, house-
hold or community housing needs. The duty to protect
includes the prevention against violations by any individual
or non-state actors like landlords, property developers, and
landowners. 
According to the Commission, the right to shelter goes fur-
ther than the provision of a roof over one’s head. It encom-
passes the right to be left alone and to live in peace, whether
or not a person has actual shelter.  It also extends to the pro-
tection against forced evictions. The destruction of houses,
homes, and villages and the harassment and obstruction of
those who attempted to rebuild their homes were held by the
Commission to be massive violations of the right to shelter.
The Commission underlined that the right to food is
inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and, it was
therefore essential for the enjoyment of other rights such as
health, education, work, and political participation. The
right to food binds states to protect and improve existing food
sources and ensure access to adequate food for all citizens.
The minimum core of this right obliges the government to
desist from destroying or contaminating food sources or
allowing private actors to contaminate food sources or pre-
vent peoples’ efforts to feed themselves. The Commission
found that the Nigerian government violated its obligations
under this right by destroying, and allowing the private oil
companies to destroy, food sources. In addition, the Com-
mission found that the Nigerian government had obstructed
the Ogoni people from feeding themselves.
This is the first time the Commission has found violations
of rights not expressly enshrined in the Charter. The
Commission, however, has interpreted the provision of the
Charter generously in the past in order to ensure better
protection of human rights. For example, it has done so in
respect of clawback clauses, such as “subject to law” and “in
accordance with law,” to several human rights provisions.
The Commission has construed these clauses, which provide
room for state parties to impose restrictions on given rights
though legislation, narrowly so that they permit limitations
to rights so long as those limitations do not defeat the pur-
pose of the Charter.
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modifications of its penalties in order to comply with the
ICCPR’s protection of minorities, the right to life, and the
right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment. Even with safeguards, it is not clear that fun-
damental rights will be protected with the introduction of
Sharia criminal law because its provisions affect both pub-
lic and private conduct of individuals. A commonly raised
question regards how to regulate the consumption of alco-
hol, where such consumption is criminalized under Sharia
but legal for non-Muslims. Furthermore, in multi-religious
states where Sharia mandates the separation of the sexes in
public education and public transportation, rights of women
in minority religious groups that do not require the sepa-
ration of the sexes will inevitably be impaired. 
In light of the above analysis, it is clear that the recom-
mendations by the Presidential Committee on the Review of
the 1999 Constitution promote freedom of religion to all
members of society and promote fundamental rights under
the ICCPR, in conformity with Nigeria’s international human
rights obligations. At the same time, the Committee’s con-
clusions address the conflict of rights dilemma by calling for
the protection of the rights of minorities to practice their reli-
gion. Moreover, preserving a secular state in which a diver-
sity of religions is practiced promotes peaceful co-existence.
Once modified, a limited application of Sharia law may be
permissible under Nigeria’s international human rights
obligations, but a new framework for Sharia law that guar-
antees these rights has yet to be developed and implemented
in Nigeria. 
* Ismene Zarifis is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law.
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Remedy
The Commission concluded its opinion by making an
appeal to the Nigerian government to ensure the protection
of the environment, health, and livelihood of the people of
Ogoniland through stipulated measures. These measures
include stopping all attacks on the Ogoni people, conduct-
ing investigations into rights violations, and ensuring ade-
quate compensation to victims and appropriate environ-
mental and social impact assessments for any future oil
development. The Commission also recommended that
Nigeria provide information on health and environmental
risks and meaningful access to regulatory and decision-mak-
ing bodies to communities likely to be affected by the
exploitation. Finally, the Commission urged the Nigerian gov-
ernment to keep it informed of progress made by the insti-
tutions mandated to respond to environmental and human
rights issues in Ogoniland.
Conclusion 
This case established strong precedent for the judicial
enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights within
the international community. It is the first claim before an
international human rights monitoring body that deals
directly with alleged violations of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights. By basing so much of its ruling within the social
and economic rights guaranteed under the African Charter,
the Commission effectively undermined arguments against
the full recognition of these rights. 
For Africa, the case marks a renewed commitment by
the Commission to the implementation of economic, social,
and cultural rights. Indeed, the African Commission indicated
at its latest session held in July 2002 that it would host sem-
inars and conferences on these rights as part of the fulfill-
ment of its promotional mandate. These developments are
encouraging, because most of the African constitutions
adopted since the end of the Cold War have entrenched eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights in their bills of rights (for
example, in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Sao
Tome and Principe, and South Africa). This decision and
other norm-setting activities of the Commission will be
instructive to domestic courts in Africa on the enforcement
of these rights.
Perhaps more importantly, the SERAC Case demonstrates
that economic, social, and cultural rights are justiciable.
This calls for the speedy ratification of the Protocol to the
Charter establishing the African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights to ensure that such important decisions are
enforced. 
*Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa is a research Ffellow at the Com-
munity Law Centre in South Africa and an LL.D. candidate at the
University of the Western Cape. 
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